

The Ontology of Conversing

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We are frequently told that we have to control our emotions and to behave ourselves in a rational manner, especially when we are children or women, by a person who wants us to behave according to some norm of his or her choice. We live a culture which opposes emotion and reason as if they were two antagonistic dimensions in the psychic space; we talk as if the emotional denied the rational and we say that the rational defines the human. At the same time we know that when we contradict our emotions we generate suffering in ourselves or in the other, which no reasoning can dissipate. Finally, when we are in contention we also say, in the heat of anger, that we have to solve our differences conversationally, and, in fact, if we manage to talk, emotions change and the contention either disappears or transforms with or without fight into a respectable disagreement. What happens? I think that, although rationality distinguishes us from other animals, the human constitutes itself when language appears in the hominid lineage to which we belong, in conversation as a particular way of living the interbraiding of emotion and rationality that appears expressed in our ability to solve our emotional and rational differences by talking. It is because of this that I consider to be central to the comprehension of the human, in health as well as in psychic or somatic suffering, to understand the participation of language and emotions in what in our daily lives we connote with the word *conversing*.

The word *conversing* comes from the union of two Latin roots, *cum*, “with”, and *versare*, “to turn around”, so that *to converse* originally means “to turn around with” the other. For this reason my question here will be: What happens in the “turning around together” of those who converse, and what happens thereby with emotions, language and reason?

Language and Linguaging

Language as a biological phenomenon consists in a flow within recurrent interactions that constitute a system of consensual coordinations of behavior (see Maturana 1978 and 1988). From this results that language as a process does not happen in the body (nervous system) of the participants in the flow, but in the space of recurrent consensual coordinations of behavior. No behavior, no particular gesture or corporal posture constitutes in itself an element of language, but it is part of it only insofar as it belongs to a recursive flow of consensual coordinations of behavior. So, words are only those gestures, sounds, behaviors or corporal postures, which participate as consensual elements in the recursive flow of the consensual coordinations of behavior that constitute language. Words are, therefore, ways of consensual coordinations of behavior. For this reason, what an observer does when he or she attributes meanings to gestures, sounds, behaviors, corporal postures that he or she distinguishes as words is to connote or to refer to the relations of consensual coordinations of behavior in which he or she sees such gestures, sounds, behaviors or corporal postures participate. In these circumstances, what an observer sees as the content of a particular languaging event exists in the flow followed by the consensual coordinations of behavior that such a languaging event involves, relative to the

moment of the history of interactions in which they occur, and which is, in turn, a function of the flow followed by these coordinations of behavior in the moment of their realization. At the same time, since in their corporal encounters participants of language mutually trigger structural changes which modulate their respective structural dynamics, these structural changes follow, in their turn, paths which are contingent to the path followed by the recurrent interactions of the participants in languaging. To put it another way, words constitute operations in the domain of existence of those who participate in language, such that, as a result, the flow of corporal, postural and emotional changes is involved with the content of their languaging. In short, what we do in our languaging has consequences in our corporal dynamics, and what happens in our corporal dynamics has consequences in our languaging.

As living beings in general, and as human beings in particular, we are multidimensional in our structural dynamics and in the dynamics of our relations. We live in our corporality the intersection of many domains of interactions that trigger corporal structural changes that belong to different operational paths. From this, it results that the flow of our languaging can also be from moment to moment contingent to many dimensions of our dynamics of interactions that do not have directly to do with what happens in languaging. And vice versa, from this also results that at every moment our interactions outside the domain of our languaging occurring at that moment are also contingent to the path of our languaging.

Reasoning and the rational

In daily life, and in many philosophical systems, we talk as if reason and the logic of reasoning had transcendental foundations, and as if such foundations give to our rational arguments universal validity. From our understanding of our operation as living beings in language we can see, nevertheless, that what happens is something different.

What in our daily life we distinguish as reasoning is the proposition of arguments which we build when we concatenate words and notions according to their meanings as operational modes of the particular domain of consensual coordinations of behavior to which they belong. Because of that, what an observer does when he speaks of the logic of reasoning as a universal phenomenon is, in fact, to distinguish the operational regularities constitutive to that operation in language (or languaging). Finally, and exactly for this reason, what in daily life we distinguish as rational behavior is our operation in discourses, explanations, or behaviors that we can justify with discourses, explanations, or arguments that we build observing the logic of reasoning. In short, the logic of reasoning, and, therefore, of rationality, belongs to the domain of operational coherences of the consensual coordinations of behavior that constitutes language, and it has its roots, ultimately, in the operational coherences of living. Finally, it is for all that we have said that the logic of reasoning is independent of the argument we have thrashed out, and it applies to all experiential domains that the observer can bring forth (to involve in his or her explanation). In these circumstances, insofar as rationality belongs to the domain of operational coherences of consensual coordinations of coordinations of behavior that constitute language, every rational system appears as a system of consensual coordinations of behavior departing from the recurrent and recursive application of some particular set of consensual coordinations of behavior that function, actually, as its fundamental premises. At the same time, different rational systems are distinguished by the fact that they are constituted from different sets of fundamental premises.

Emotioning

In daily life we distinguish different emotions when looking at the actions and corporal posture or behavior of another being, whether it is our self, another person or a non-human animal. Furthermore, we also know that in daily life every emotion implies that only certain actions are possible to the person or animal that exhibits them. For these reasons, I maintain that what we distinguish as emotions, or what we connote with the word *emotion*, are *corporal dispositions that specify at every moment the domain of actions of an animal* (human or non human), and that *emotioning, as a flow of one emotion to another, is a flow of one domain of actions to another*. The cockroach that slowly crosses the kitchen and suddenly starts to run towards a dark spot when we come in, turn on the lights, and make noises, has had an emotional change, and in its emotional flow has passed from one domain of actions to another. Actually, in daily life we also recognize that by saying that the cockroach has changed from calmness to fear. In this case, in using the same terms we use to refer to human emotioning, we are not anthropomorphizing what happens to the cockroach, but recognizing that emotioning is a fundamental aspect of the animal functioning that we ourselves also exhibit. To say that the emotional has to do, in ourselves, with the animal, is certainly not novel; what I add, nevertheless, is that human existence realizes itself in language and that rationality arises out of the emotional. In fact, when I invite you to recognize that emotions are corporal dispositions that specify domains of action and that different emotions are distinguished precisely because they specify different domains of action, I invite you to recognize that due to all this, human action, no matter what the operational space in which it occurs, is established in the emotional because it occurs in a space of actions which is specified departing from an emotion. With reasoning the same occurs.

All rational systems, and, actually, all reasoning, occur as an operation in the coherences in language from a primary body of coordinations of actions taken as fundamental premises accepted or adopted, explicitly or implicitly, *a priori*. Nevertheless, it happens that all acceptance *a priori* occurs from a particular emotional domain in which we want what we accept and accept what we want, without other foundation besides our desire that constitutes and expresses itself in our acceptance. In other words, all rational systems have emotional foundations, and therefore no rational argument can convince anybody that is not already convinced to accept *a priori* premises that constitute it.

Behavior and Actions

Any operation or change in operation of an organism in relation to an environment, in any domain in which the observer distinguishes this operation or change in operation, is a behavior or action in this domain. At the same time, we human beings live any behavioral space or space of actions as an experiential space in language moving within it in the recursion of the behavioral coordinations (of actions) that constitute that space, and by means of which we distinguish it. This is possible because, due to the operational closure of the nervous system (see Maturana 1983), all domains of human actions or behaviors realize themselves in the nervous system as a domain of internal correlations that appear in the distinctions of an observer as senso-motor correlations in a space of corporal relations. Thus, languaging, although resulting from the dynamics of internal correlations of the participants' nervous systems, is seen by the observer as a flow of consensual coordinations of behavior that results in a congruent interbraiding of individual senso-motor correlations of these nervous systems. In other words, different domains

of human experiences are different domains of internal correlations which in the space of distinctions of the observer occur as different domains of senso-motor correlations that configure different systems of behavioral coordinations in language. I have been using the words *behavior* and *action* as being equivalent to each other when referring to language because in this particular case they are equivalent. These words, nevertheless, have different connotations in other cases. So, usually when talking about actions we look preferably to relations of the doer. For the purposes of this article these differences are not meaningful, and the only interesting thing to know is that we can talk about languaging as an operation in a space of consensual coordinations of behavior as well as an operation in a space of consensual coordinations of actions.

Conversing

From the moment of its conception the child lives immersed in the languaging and emotioning of its mother and of other adults and children that constitute its surroundings of coexistence during pregnancy and after birth. The result is that as an embryo, fetus, child or adult, a human being acquires his or her emotioning in his or her ongoing existence which is congruent with the emotioning of other beings, human or non-human, with whom he or she lives. We would normally say that the child learns to emotion him/herself in different manners as a human being to the emotioning of other adults and children (and other animals) that constitute his/her human and non-human surroundings and will be cheerful, touched, embarrassed, angry... according to the contingencies of the circumstances in which its peers become cheerful, touched, embarrassed, angry... etc. Since this process happens in every new human together with the constitution and expansion of the domains of consensual coordinations of behavior in which he or she participates -- at first until these domains become recursive and he or she starts to operate in language, and later in the expansion of insofar as he or she amplifies and complexifies his/her living in language -- languaging and emotioning interbraid themselves in a mutual modulation as a simple result of this coexistence with others in a path which is contingent with this coexistence. When we move within language in interactions with others, our emotions change according to an emotioning which is the function of the history of interactions that we have lived and in which our emotioning emerged as an aspect of our coexistence with others outside and inside languaging. At the same time, with the flow of our emotioning in a path that has resulted from our history of common life inside and outside language, we change our domain of actions and, therefore, the path of our languaging and of our reasoning changes. This interbraided flow of languaging and emotioning I call *conversing* and I call *conversation* the flow of conversing within a particular network of languaging and emotioning.

The human

The human appears, in the evolutionary history of hominid language to which we belong, when language appears. I would like to say a little bit more about this, but first I want to talk about the evolutionary process.

In the biological domain, a species is a lineage or system of lineages constituted as such in the transgenerational conservation of a particular manner of living in the reproductive history of a series of organisms. Since every living being exists as a dynamic system in ongoing structural change, the manner of living that defines a species, a lineage, or a system of lineages, occurs as a dynamic configuration of relations between living being and medium that lasts during its

ontogeny from conception until death. The manner of living, or dynamic configuration of ontogenic relations between living being and medium, which being conserved transgenerationally in a succession of organisms constitutes a lineage or a system of lineages and defines its identity as such, I call *ontogenic phenotype*. The ontogenic phenotype is not determined genetically because, as a manner of living that is developed in ontogeny, or individual history of every organism, it is a phenotype, and as such occurs in this individual history necessarily in an epigenetic manner. What the genetic constitution of an organism determines in the moment of its conception is a domain of possible ontogenies, in which its history of interactions with the medium will realize one particular ontogeny in an epigenetic process. Because of that, when a lineage or a system of lineages is constituted, the genotype, the genetic constitution of organisms that constitute it, remains free and can vary insofar as such variations do not interfere with the conservation of the ontogenic phenotype that defines the lineage or system of lineages. That is precisely why, if in a particular moment of the reproductive history of a lineage the ontogenic phenotype that is conserved from then on changes, the identity of the lineage changes or a new lineage appears as a new form or type of organism. In these circumstances, in order to understand what happens in the history of the evolutionary change of any type of organism, it is necessary to find the ontogenic phenotype that is conserved in it and around which such changes are produced. So, in order to understand the evolutionary history that gives origin to humans, it is necessary, first, to look at the manner of living which being conserved in the system of hominid lineages makes possible the origin of language, and next to look at the new manner of living that being conserved establishes the lineage to which we modern human beings belong.

Let us consider this for one moment. The origin of language as a domain of consensual coordinations of behavior requires a space of encounters in mutual acceptance sufficiently intense and recurrent (see Maturana 1987 and 1988). What we know about our ancestors that lived in Africa three and a half million years ago indicate that they had a manner of living centered around harvesting, the sharing of food, the collaboration of males and females in the upbringing of the progeny, around a sensual coexistence, and a face to face sexuality in a realm of small groups formed by a few young adults and children. This manner of living that we still fundamentally conserve offers all that is required for the origin of language, as well as, once this manner of living is established, for the ontogenic phenotype that defines the system of lineages to which we modern human beings belong to become constituted with the inclusion of conversing as another element to be conserved in the manner of living. The fact that modern chimpanzees and gorillas can be incorporated in language through coexistence with them in AMESLAN (American Sign Language) suggests that the brain of our ancestors of three million years ago might have been adequate for language. What distinguishes the hominid lineage from other lineages of primates is a manner of living in which the sharing of food with all that it implies of proximity, mutual acceptance, and coordinations of actions in passing things from one to another plays a central role. It is the hominid manner of living that makes language possible, and it is *love*, as the emotion that constitutes the space of actions in which the hominid manner of living occurs, that is the central emotion in the evolutionary history that gives origin to us. That this is so is clear from the fact that the largest part of human diseases, somatic as well as psychic, belong to a domain of interference with love. Nevertheless, the typically human way of living constitutes itself when conversing is aggregated to the hominid manner of living and languaging interbraided with emotioning begins to be conserved as part of the ontogenic phenotype that defines us. When the typically human manner of living appears, conversing as action belongs to

the emotional domain in which language appears as a manner of being in the coordinations of actions in the intimacy of sensual and sexual coexistence. That this is so is clear in several ways:

- a) in the tactile images that we use when referring to what occurs to us with voices during speech such that we say that a voice can be soft, caressing or hard;
- b) in the physiological changes, for example hormonal changes, that we mutually trigger in speech;
- c) in the pleasure that we have in conversing and in moving within languaging.

When would this have started in our evolutionary history? The immense current structural compromise of our nervous system, larynx, face, as well as of other aspects of our body with speech as our most fundamental manner of being in language, indicates that vocal languaging must have started several million years ago; it seems to me, between two and three.

In short: the human appears in the evolutionary history to which we belong when language appears, but it constitutes itself in fact and as such in the conservation of a particular manner of living centered around the sharing of food, the cooperation of males and females in the upbringing of children, the individualized recurrent sensual encounters, conversing, and around the pleasure of living in conversing. Because of that every human activity departs from an emotion, and nothing human occurs outside the interbraiding of languaging and emotioning and, therefore, the human is lived always in conversing. Finally, the emotioning in which the conservation of the human is constituted when language appears is centered around the pleasure of coexistence in the acceptance of the other close to oneself, that is, in love, which is the emotion that constitutes the space of actions in which we accept the other in our coexistence. That fact that love is the emotion that establishes in the origin of the human the enjoyment of conversing which characterizes us makes our welfare as well as our suffering depend upon our conversing.

Consequences

Let us now see some of the consequences of the proposition that all human activities belong to and happen in no matter kind of conversation:

1. To say that all human activities happen in conversing is to say that all human activities, no matter what the experiential domain where they happen, from those conversations that constitute the physical space to those that constitute the mystical space, happen as a flow of consensual coordinations of behavior in a consensual interbraiding with an emotional flow that can also be consensual. For this reason, different human activities distinguish themselves by the experiential domain in which the actions that constitute them occur, as well as by the emotional flow that they involve, and, in fact, occur in coexistence as different networks of conversations.
2. Human emotioning has its origin in the emotioning of mammals and primates, and because of that it admits the consensual modulation in the path of the coordinations of behavior outside as well as inside language; because of that, also, our emotional flow has spontaneous turns or changes that seem completely outside our history of conceptual living. At the same time, since every emotional change is a change in the domain of actions and, therefore, in the

rational domain, due to our non-consensual emotional flow or due to our consensual emotional flow outside language, it results that often our discourse and our reasoning change in a manner that seems alien to us according to the path that a moment ago our conversation followed, and we find ourselves in an emotioning and reasoning that appear unexpected even after further reflection. An observer can describe such changes as a result of an emotional unconscious dynamics because they appear outside the consensuality of conversation and, therefore, outside the operability of a consensual origin accessible to immediate reflection. In short, in our daily life the interbraiding of our emotioning with our living and co-living, be it consensual or not, results in such a way that our emotioning follows a path which is contingent to our conversation as well as to the internal dynamics and to our interactions outside language, but which can, in general, be brought through reflection to conversing.

3. There are as many types of conversations as recurrent ways of flowing in the interbraiding of emotioning and languaging that occur in different aspects of daily life; because of that, our different ways of being human beings, in individual solitude or in coexistence, configure themselves as different types of conversations according to the emotions involved, the coordinated actions, and the operational domains of the praxis of living in which these conversations occur. At the same time, due to the multidimensionality of the human relational world in language, different operational domains that are configured in the recursion of consensual coordinations of behavior give origin to emotional domains that do not exist otherwise. Therefore, emotions like shame, disgust, ambition and others are proper to the operation in the relational space that appear in language because they occur as denial or desire within the domains constituted in reflection about our own activity or about the activity of others. Conversations, therefore, involve a consensual emotioning interbraided with languaging in which there are kinds of emotions not present in the mammal emotioning outside the recursion of the consensual coordinations of behavior in languaging. Let us see some of these kinds of conversations:
 - a) A culture is a network of conversations that define a way of living, a way of being oriented in existence in the human domain, and involves a manner of acting, a manner of emotioning, and a manner of growing in acting and emotioning. One grows in a culture by living in it as a particular way of being human in the network of conversations that defines it. Because of that, the members of a culture effortlessly live the network of conversations that constitute it, as a natural and spontaneous background, like the one which is given and in which one finds him/herself by the simple fact of being, independently of the social as well as non-social systems to which one can belong.
 - b) Different systems of coexistence that we constitute daily differ in the emotion that specifies the basic space of actions in which our relations with the other and with ourselves occur. Therefore we have:
 - i. Social systems, that are systems of coexistence constituted beneath the emotion of love, which is the emotion that constitutes the space of actions of acceptance of the other in coexistence. According to this, systems of coexistence established in an emotion different from love are not social systems.
 - ii. Systems of work, that are systems of coexistence constituted beneath the emotion of compromise, which is an emotion that constitutes the space of actions

of acceptance of an agreement in the realization of a task. According to this, systems of work relations are not social systems.

iii. Hierarchical systems or power systems, that are systems of coexistence constituted beneath the emotion that constitutes actions of auto-negation and negation of the other in the acceptance of self-submission or submission of the other in a dynamics of order and obedience. According to this hierarchical systems are not social systems.

Naturally, there are further systems of coexistence established from other emotions, but what might be stressed here is that every one of them is constituted as a particular network of conversations that configures a particular way of emotioning from a defining emotion.

4. There are conversations that stabilize particular emotional dynamics as a result of the particular manner of interbraiding languaging and emotioning that constitutes them. Some of these conversations give origin to recurrent emotional dynamics that bring forth contradictory domains of actions in the sense that the actions that constitute them mutually deny themselves. Let us see three cases (see Méndez, Coddou and Maturana 1988):
 - a) conversations in which we implicitly accuse the other, whose company we desire, of not fulfilling promises that he or she never made. When this occurs, the one who is accused gets angry and begins to deny the other. If this kind of conversation is occasional and reflection and apologies are suitable, this conversation's results are unimportant in the emotional history of the participants. If, on the contrary, this conversation repeatedly recurs in circumstances in which the accused does not want to act out anger because he or she wants the company of the other, and reflection and regrets are not suitable, or, regardless of reflection and regrets the conversation is recurrent, suffering occurs. That is, the participants here move in a continuous oscillation between domains of contradictory actions: mutual acceptance and mutual denying.
 - b) conversations of self-depreciation, which we make in our reflexive intimacy or in our encounters with others. These occur, for example, when in the path of a conversation we say, or say to ourselves, "I am stupid and I do everything clumsily". In doing this we enter, necessarily, in an interbraided flow of emotioning and languaging that leads us to domains of contradictory actions that interfere with the quality of our activity, no matter what the operational domain in which we find ourselves. When this occurs, the result of our activity seems to confirm our self-depreciation. If we live this kind of conversation recurrently, we stabilize a dynamics of languaging and emotioning that continuously confirms as adequate our negative appreciation of ourselves, and we live the suffering of wanting and denying ourselves at the same time within the impossibility of changing our essential constitutive condition. Again, if this conversation is occasional, there is no suffering.
 - c) conversations of "must". In the flow of these conversations with others or during reflection, we indicate to ourselves our guilt for not accomplishing or for accomplishing unsatisfactorily some cultural value or norm. The result is the emotioning in the frustration that brings forth a domain of actions in which the

accomplishing of the value or norm is impossible. If we live this sort of conversation occasionally, its occurrence is unimportant, but if we live it recurrently, we experience suffering.

- 5) We living beings are multidimensional in our domains of interactions and in our internal dynamics, therefore we always participate in many conversations that intercross in our corporal dynamics simultaneously or successively. The main result of this is that the emotioning of a conversation affects the emotioning of the other, in such a way that changes are produced in the path of intercrossed conversations that do not originate in the relational domain in which they occur. When this happens, changes in action and/or in reasoning, produced in the different operational domains in which different conversations occur, appear to the actor as well as to the observer as unexpected and unjustified in themselves, and can be treated by them as original acts, creative, arbitrary, or crazy, according to the way of listening and to the explanation given about their origin. At the same time, it can also happen that as a result of this intercrossing in emotioning of different conversations some conversations become recurrent, originating suffering or resulting in the lack of the realization of some tasks. So, for example, if I am in the realization of a certain task and notice somebody observing me, I can go into two conversations whose emotional dynamics intercross. One conversation can be “I like to do this, but it has to be done with care and attention in order to succeed”; the other conversation can be, “I do not like anybody looking at me when I am doing something”. When this occurs, I realize my task in an emotion which is different from pleasure, that is, in frustration which is the desire of being in a different place from the one we are in, or in expectation which is the desire of having the results of an action before having completed it. When this occurs, since we do not realize that in this moment our emotioning appears from the intercrossing of two conversations and we do not see its origin in our activity, we ascribe our disappointment or dissatisfaction to the circumstances in which our activity happens and we accuse them of interfering with our work.
- 6) The larger part of our sufferings arise from recurrent conversations or from intercrossing of conversations that lead us repeatedly to operate in contradictory domains of actions. This is doubtless what makes possible the conversational therapy practiced in psychology. To the extent that suffering emerges from the recurrent living in contradictory spaces of actions continuously generated in the emotioning of recurrent conversations or in the intercrossing of conversations, it is possible to dissolve suffering with conversations which interfere with the recurrence of or with the intercrossing of such conversations. In other words, the effectivity of individual or familiar psychotherapy is rooted in the fact that in the emotional flow that it necessarily carries along, therapist and patient can drift to a space of common living in which the client’s daily conversational space can change. In this moment, there exist many different practices that achieve this under different forms and circumstances of interactions of therapist and client or clients. To my understanding all these practices do the same, even if they are not interchangeable because their individual effectiveness is different according to the operational domain in which different particular conversations happen and through which suffering occurs.

Conclusions

Our understanding that we human beings exist as such in the intercrossing of many conversations in many different operational domains that configure many domains of different realities is particularly meaningful because it allows us to recover the emotional as a fundamental domain of our being humans. In the evolutionary history the human is configured with conversing when language appears as a recursive operation in the consensual coordinations of behavior that happen in the domain of a particular manner of living in the flow of the co-emotioning of the members of a particular group of primates. Because of that, when conversing appears with the appearance of language, the human becomes established in the inextricable interbraiding of languaging and emotioning that is conversing. In the patriarchal cultural delusion to which we belong in the West, and that now seems to be spread throughout the earth, emotions have been devalued in favor of reason as if reason could exist independently or in contraposition to emotions. To recognize that the human realizes itself in the intercrossing of languaging and emotioning that appears with language gives us the possibility of our reintegrating ourselves in these two dimensions with an extensive comprehension of the processes that constitute us in our daily being, as well as the possibility of respecting as legitimate these two aspects of our being.

Very early we are told that we have to control or to deny our emotions because they give origin to the arbitrariness of the non-rational. Now we know that this is not so. In conversing, what is rational also appears as the way of being in the flow of the operational coherences of consensual coordinations of behavior in languaging. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of reasoning in guiding the coordinations of actions in technical activity blinds us to the non-rational foundation of every rational domain, and transforms, due to its pretense of non-arbitrariness, any rational assertion into a demand for obedience from the other that limits our possibilities of reflection because it precludes us from seeing ourselves in the emotional dynamics of conversing. This is important because, although it may seem to go against the grain, when we take responsibility for the participation of emotions as a foundation for any rational system in the flow of conversation, we obtain the actual value of reason in the comprehension of the human. And this is so because now we know that we have to recognize our emotions and understand them in their flow, when we want our behavior to be effectively rational by means of the understanding of the rational.

Finally, the recognition of the interbraiding between emotioning and languaging that every conversation and, therefore, that all human activity is, offers the basis for the understanding of two additional dimensions of human beings, i.e., *responsibility* and *freedom*:

- a) we are responsible in the moment in which in our reflection we recognize if we want or do not want the consequences of our emotions;
- b) we are free in the moment in which in our reflections about our activities we recognize whether we do want or do not want our wanting of the consequences of our activities, and we realize that our wanting or not wanting the consequences of our actions can change our wanting or not wanting.

In these circumstances, it may be that the most illuminating aspect of these reflections about the ontology of conversation is in understanding that the rational comprehension of the most fundamental aspect of human life, which is in responsibility and freedom, emerge from the reflection about emotioning that shows the non-rational basis of what is rational.